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Abstract. In this paper we present an extension of Peirce’s existen-
tial graphs to provide a diagrammatic representation of expressions in
Quantified Equilibrium Logic (QEL). Using this formalisation, logical
connectives are replaced by encircled regions (circles and squares) and
quantified variables are represented as “identity” lines. Although the ex-
pressive power is equivalent to that of QEL, the new representation can
be useful for illustrative or educational purposes.
1 Introduction
Most efforts in Knowledge Representation (KR) have been traditionally focused
on symbolic manipulation and, in particular, on logical formulation. The use
of a formal representation is surely convenient for automated reasoning, since
computer languages provide nowadays excellent tools for symbolic representa-
tion and processing. Unfortunately, something that is simpler for computational
treatment is not always necessarily better for human understanding. Educational
experiences show that learning and understanding logical notation takes some
time and effort to novel students. Even for an experienced student, reading a
formula that nests different quantifiers, connectives or parentheses may become
a difficult task and lead to errors in formal specification.
One alternative to formal languages that is probably closer to human’s intu-
ition is the use of graphical or diagrammatic representations. In fact, diagram-
matic KR has also been explored and used in different fields of Artificial Intelli-
gence – a prominent example is, for instance, Sowa’s conceptual graphs [1, 2]. But
the use of diagrams for logical representation is older than KR and AI, and ac-
tually comes from the very origins of modern philosophical logic. As commented
by Sowa in [3], the use of diagrams in logic was something common before the
introduction of the current notation, conceived by Peano1 in 1889 [4]. In fact,
Frege’s original formulation of Predicate Calculus already included some dia-
grammatic component. But it was Charles Sanders Peirce who first introduced2 a
? This research was partially supported by MINECO project TIN2013-42149-P, Spain.
1 Peano’s quantifiers ∃,∀ correspond to the inverted letters E and A, whereas ∨ comes
from Latin vel (“or”) and conjunction ∧ from its inversion.
2 Peirce’s first proposals of existential graphs date back to 1882, even earlier than
Peano’s publication of the modern symbolic notation.
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full-blown non-symbolic system for first-order logic: existential graphs [5] (EGs).
This graphical system allows a complete characterisation of First-Order Logic
in diagrammatic terms, without using logical connectives. However, save few ex-
ceptions (like their influence in Sowa’s conceptual graphs [3]), the truth is that
EGs did not gain the same popularity as the symbolic notation for classical logic,
even though they provide an elegant and simple representation that seems very
suitable for educational purposes. Perhaps one of the difficulties for their con-
solidation has to do with their strong dependence on classical logic. Existential
graphs take conjunction, negation and existential quantifiers as primitive con-
structors, building all the rest (disjunction, implication or universal quantifica-
tion) as derived operations. This approach leaves no room for other non-classical
logics such as intuitionistic or intermediate logics, where we may need keeping
all these connectives independently.
In this paper we study an extension of existential graphs to be used as an
alternative diagrammatic notation for Answer Set Programming [6–8] (ASP)
and, in particular, for its logical formalisation in terms of Equilibrium Logic [9].
Proposed by David Pearce, Equilibrium Logic has allowed the application of the
stable model semantics [10], originally defined for the syntax of logic programs,
to the case of arbitrary propositional formulas. Moreover, the extension to the
first-order case, known as Quantified Equilibrium Logic [11], provides nowadays
a general logical notion of stable models for arbitrary theories expressed in the
syntax of First-Order Logic. Equilibrium Logic is defined by imposing a model
selection criterion on top of a monotonic intermediate logic known as the logic of
Here-and-There [12] (HT). In this logic, implication is a primitive operation and,
although disjunction can be defined in terms of the former plus conjunction, its
representation as a derived operator is rather cumbersome. Something similar
happens in Quantified HT [11] where, again, the existential quantifier is definable
in terms of the universal one, but it is much more convenient to treat both of
them as primitive connectives. In the paper, we extend EGs to allow dealing
with all these operators independently by just adding a new graphical primitive
(rectangles) to the closed curves and lines already existing in EGs.
This short note constitutes a preliminary proposal, providing several illus-
trative examples of the potential use, mostly for educational or visualisation
purposes.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide
an overview of Existential Graphs, both alpha graphs corresponding to proposi-
tional logic, and beta graphs for first-order logic. In Section 3, we summarise the
main definitions of Quantified Equilibrium Logic, assuming a static Herbrand
domain, which is the most common case in ASP. The main contributions are
presented in Sections 4 and 5 that respectively introduce the extensions of alpha
and beta graphs for Equilibrium Logic, providing some examples of their use.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2
2 Existential Graphs
We recall next the essential components of existential graphs. Peirce classified
EGs into three types, alpha, beta and gamma, that respectively correspond to
Propositional Calculus, First-Order Logic with equality and (a kind of) normal
modal logic. We start defining alpha graphs as follows. A diagram in alpha graphs
is recursively defined as one of the following:
– the main page (when empty, it represents truth)
– atomic propositions
– a region encircled by a closed curve (called cut), which denotes the negation
of the subdiagram inside the region. An empty cut represents falsity.
– finally, although it is not a drawing in itself, the inclusion of several elements
inside the same region or cut (including the full page) is implicitly understood
as their conjunction
As an example, Fig. 1(a) explicitly represents the formula ¬(rains∧¬umbrella∧
¬wet) which can also be seen as the implications rains ∧ ¬umbrella → wet or
rains∧¬wet→ umbrella or the disjunction ¬rains∨umbrella∨wet, since all these
representations are equivalent in classical propositional logic. Using conjunction
and negation as primitive operators, we can easily represent an implication p→ q
as ¬(p∧¬q) (Fig. 1(b)) and a disjunction p∨q as ¬(¬p∧¬q) (Fig. 1(c)). Another
common feature shown in these examples is that areas encircled by an odd num-
ber of cuts (negative areas) are sometimes shaded to facilitate the visualisation.
 rains
umbrella wet
(a) An example
 p  q
(b) p→ q
 q p
(c) p ∨ q
Fig. 1. Some alpha graphs.
The alpha system was accompanied by a set of inference and equivalence (di-
agram redrawing) rules that was proved to be sound and complete with respect
to Propositional Calculus (note that, at the time, Tarskian model-based seman-
tics had not been developed yet). In this preliminary proposal, we will focus on
the representation itself, leaving graphical inference in the logic of HT or even
in (non-monotonic) Equilibrium Logic for a future study.
For representing first-order expressions, Peirce extended alpha graphs to beta
graphs by the inclusion of a new type of component in the diagram, lines of
identity. A line of identity is an open line that connects one or more atom
names. When it is used to connect more than two atom names, the identity
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line may bifurcate as many times as needed, getting the shape of a tree or a
spider with several ramifications. The reading for an identity line is an exis-
tential quantifier: “there exists some individual such that . . . ” Figure 3 shows
several examples. Fig. 2(a) asserts that there is a red car parked at a street:
∃x∃y(car(x) ∧ red(x) ∧ parkedAt(x, y) ∧ street(y)). Fig. 2(b) means that there
is some person that loves herself, ∃x(person(x)∧ loves(x, x)). Fig. 2(c) says that
every man is mortal, ¬∃x(man(x)∧¬mortal(x)) or, if preferred, ∀x(man(x)→
mortal(x)). Finally, Fig. 2(d) specifies that there is a woman adored by every
catholic: ∃x(woman(x) ∧ ∀y(catholic(y)→ adores(y, x))).
car red
parkedAt
street
(a)
person
loves
(b)
 mortal
 man
(c)
womanadores
catholic
(d)
Fig. 2. Examples of beta graphs.
As we can see, identity lines introduce a subtle difference in the role of atom
names in beta graphs. Atoms represent now n-ary predicates whose arguments
correspond to imaginary place holders surrounding the atom name that are used
as endpoints of identity lines. In the case of unary predicates, such as man or
car, the position of this place holder is irrelevant. However, when the predicate
arity is greater than one, the argument location becomes relevant: for instance,
in Fig. 3, predicate adores has a left argument that corresponds to the adorer
and a right argument corresponding to the adored person.
Another important observation is that beta graphs do not provide a specific
method for representing constants. For instance, there is no way for expressing
that every catholic adores (Virgin) Mary other than using a unary predicate
Mary to designate that specific person instead of some abstract woman.
One final remark on identity lines is that they can be actually seen as an
implicit equality predicate. Some representations even introduce a label “is” for
the identity line to emphasize this feature. Following this interpretation, when
an identity runs through an empty cut we get a convenient way to represent an
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inequality of the form x 6= y. As an example, the diagram in Figure ?? represents
the monotheist sentence “there is a God and only one God.”
God God
Fig. 3. ∃x(God(x) ∧ ¬∃y(x 6= y ∧God(y)))
3 Quantified Equilibrium Logic
For the sake of completeness, we recall in this section the basic definitions of
Quantified Equilibrium Logic for function-free theories and Herbrand domains,
since this is the most frequent situation in ASP. We consider first-order languages
L = 〈D,P 〉 built over a set of constant symbols, D (the Herbrand domain), and
a set of predicate symbols, P . The sets of L-formulas, L-sentences and atomic
L-sentences are defined in the usual way. If D is a non-empty set, we denote
by At(D,P ) the set of ground atomic sentences of the language 〈D,P 〉. By
an L-interpretation I over a set D we mean a subset of At(D,P ). A classical
Herbrand L-structure can be regarded as a tuple M = 〈D, I〉 where I is an
L-interpretation over D.
A here-and-there L-structure is a tuple M = 〈D, Ih, It〉 where 〈D, Ih〉 and
〈D, It〉 are classical Herbrand L-structures such that Ih ⊆ It. We say that the
structure is total when Ih = It. We can think of a here-and-there structure M
as similar to a first-order classical model, but having two parts, or components,
h and t, that correspond to two different points or “worlds”, ‘here’ and ‘there’,
in the sense of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, where the worlds are
ordered by h ≤ t.
We assume that L contains the constants > and ⊥ and regard ¬ϕ as an
abbreviation for ϕ → ⊥. Satisfaction of formulas is defined as follows. Given
some world w ∈ {h, t}:
– M, w |= >, M, w 6|= ⊥
– M, w |= p iff p ∈ Iw for any atom p ∈ At(D,P )
– M, w |= c = d iff c and d denote the same constant from D
– M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ.
– M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ.
– M, t |= ϕ→ ψ iff M, t 6|= ϕ or M, t |= ψ.
– M, h |= ϕ→ ψ iff M, t |= ϕ→ ψ and M, h 6|= ϕ or M, h |= ψ.
– M, w |= ∀xϕ(x) iff M, w |= ϕ(d) for all d ∈ D.
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– M, w |= ∃xϕ(x) iff M, w |= ϕ(d) for some d ∈ D.
We say that M is a model of a sentence ϕ iff M, h |= ϕ. The resulting
logic is called Quantified Here-and-There Logic with static domains and decidable
equality (QHT, for short).
Definition 1 (Equilibrium model). Let ϕ be an L-sentence. An equilibrium
model of ϕ is a total model M = 〈D, It, It〉 of ϕ such that there is no model of
ϕ of the form 〈D, Ih, It〉 where Ih is a proper subset of It.
When 〈D, It, It〉 is an equilibrium model of ϕ we say that the classical (Her-
brand) interpretation 〈D, It〉 is a stable model of ϕ.
4 Equilibrium Alpha Graphs
Let us begin considering the use of alpha graphs to represent Equilibrium Logic
theories (or ASP logic programs). A first difficulty we face is that implication is
a primitive operator in HT, and cannot be represented in terms of conjunction
and disjunction (see Theorem 4 in [13]). This generates a conflict with the use
of material implication in alpha graphs, defined in terms of negation and con-
junction. To overcome this problem, we replace the cut component (negation) by
a new diagrammatic construction we will simply call conditional. A conditional
has the form of a closed curve (or ellipse) and may contain inside a number
n ≥ 0 of rectangles we call consequents. Intuitively, when all the elements in-
side the ellipse (but not in the rectangles) hold then one of the rectangles must
hold (that is, we implicitly have a disjunction of consequents). As an example,
Fig. 4(a) represents the implication toss→ head∨ tails. The case of 0 rectangles
corresponds to an implication with ⊥ (the empty disjunction) as a consequent.
In other words, a conditional without consequents is just read as a negation, as
happens in Peirce’s alpha diagrams. As an example, Fig. 4(b) represents now the
implication rains ∧ ¬umbrella → wet, that is, rains ∧ (umbrella → ⊥) → wet. It
is perhaps worth to compare to Fig. 1(a) where, as we commented before, there
was no way to differentiate between a negative condition in the antecedent and
a positive condition in the consequent (wet and umbrella played the same role).
This reflected the non-directional nature of material implication. Under our new
notation, Fig. 4(b) allows now distinguishing the elements in the consequent (wet
is inside a rectangle) from those in the antecedent, either negated (umbrella) or
not (rains).
As we have seen, when the conditional has no consequents, it corresponds
to a negation. In an analogous way, when the conditional has an an empty
antecedent (it only contains rectangles) it obviously represents a disjunction.
Fig. 4(c) represents the disjunction red ∨ orange ∨ green for the possible colors
of a traffic light.
A disjunction p ∨ q in HT can be defined in terms of conjunction and impli-
cation, as it is equivalent to the expression
((p→ q)→ q) ∧ ((q → p)→ p)
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 toss
head tails
(a) toss → head ∨ tails
 rains
umbrella wet
(b) rains ∧ ¬umbrella → wet
orangered green
(c) red ∨ orange ∨ green
Fig. 4. Examples of conditionals.
whose diagrammatic representation is shown in Figure 5. However, the only “ad-
vantage” we would gain using this representation (as primitive for disjunction)
is that we would not need more than one rectangle in each conditional, while we
would clearly lose readability.
p qq q pp
Fig. 5. ((p→ q) → q) ∧ ((q → p) → p)
An interesting construction in ASP is the use of choice rules. The original
way to build a choice that causes the non-deterministic addition of an atom p in
ASP was using some auxiliary predicate q and building an even negative cycle
as the one shown in Figure 6(a). A second possibility that does not require an
auxiliary predicate is using the formula p∨¬p (which is not a tautology in HT)
represented in Figure 6(b).
To conclude this section, we illustrate a typical example from Non-Monotonic
Reasoning. Fig. 7 encodes a propositional program with two rules respectively
asserting that a bird normally flies and that a penguin is an abnormal bird.
5 Equilibrium Beta Graphs
As happened with implication in the propositional case, the universal quantifier
is a primitive operator in QEL and cannot be represented in terms of existen-
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q p p q
(a) (¬q → p) ∧ (¬p→ q)
pp
(b) p ∨ ¬p
Fig. 6. Choice rules.
 bird
abnormal flies
(a) bird ∧ ¬abnormal → flies
 penguin
bird
abnormal
(b) penguin→abnormal∧bird
Fig. 7. Birds and penguins.
tial quantifiers and the other connectives3. Therefore, introducing identity lines
would not suffice to cover the expressive power of QEL if they were always read
as existential quantifiers. Fortunately, since we count with a new conditional
connective, whose expressiveness is richer than the simple cut, we can use it
to cover both existential and universal quantifiers as follows. Any identity line
encircled by a conditional and with some portion outside any consequent (rect-
angle) of that conditional corresponds to a universal quantifier. Figure 8 shows
some examples combining conditionals and identity lines. Fig. 8(a) corresponds
to a universal quantifier, saying that all men are mortal:
∀x(man(x)→ mortal(x)) (1)
Note the difference with respect to the version in Fig. 2(c), where we had a cut
(negation) instead of the rectangle. This version is still a correct equilibrium
beta graph, but its reading corresponds to:
∀x(man(x) ∧ ¬mortal(x)→ ⊥) (2)
which has a quite different meaning from (1): the latter is a rule that allows
deriving mortal(x) from any man(x), whereas (2) acts as a constraint, forbidding
stable models where some man is not known to be mortal. Another equivalent
reading of a constraint like Fig. 2(c) (i.e. a conditional with existential lines but
no consequents) is just as a negation of an existential quantifier:
¬∃x(man(x) ∧ ¬mortal(x))
3 It is actually the other way around. Any existentially quantified formula ∃xP (x) is
QHT equivalent to ∀x∀y((P (x) → P (y)) → P (y)).
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 mortal
 man
(a) ∀x(man(x) → mortal(x))
 mortal
 man
(b) ∃x(man(x) → mortal(x))
 mortal
 man
(c) ∀x(man(x) → mortal)
Fig. 8. Some conditionals with identity lines.
Fig. 8(b) corresponds to an existential quantifier: it contains an identity
line which is not encircled by the conditional (it “comes from outside”). As for
Fig. 8(c), it represents a universal quantifier: it is encircled by the conditional and
(fully) outside the consequent, representing the formula ∀x(man(x) → mortal).
However, a case like this (the line does not cross any rectangle) can also be read
as an existential quantifier in the antecedent, since the last formula is equivalent
to (∃x man(x))→ mortal.
To conclude this section, we provide an example encoding the well-known
Hamiltonian cycle problem: given a graph G, find a cyclic path that visits each
node in G exactly once. We assume that the graph G is provided in terms of
facts for the binary predicate edge, related to node names. The Hamiltonian path
is encoded using a binary predicate in, meaning that the corresponding edge is
included in the path, for a given stable model.
Figure 9 shows a possible diagrammatic representation of this problem. The
corresponding formulas, reading all the conditionals from left to right and from
up to down would respectively be:
∀x∀y ( edge(x, y)→ node(x) ∧ node(y) ) (3)
∀x∀y ( edge(x, y)→ in(x, y) ∨ ¬in(x, y) ) (4)
¬∃x∃y∃z (in(x, y) ∧ in(x, z) ∧ y 6= z ) (5)
¬∃x∃y∃z (x 6= y ∧ in(x, z) ∧ in(y, z) ) (6)
∀x∀y ( in(x, y)→ reach(x, y) ) (7)
∀x∀y∀z ( reach(x, y) ∧ in(y, z)→ reach(x, z) ) (8)
¬∃x∃y (node(x) ∧ node(y) ∧ ¬reach(x, y) ) (9)
All of them can be easily rewritten as program rules in standard ASP syntax.
(3) asserts that the two arguments of predicate edge are nodes. (4) is a non-
deterministic choice to include any edge in the stable model or not. (5) and (6)
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edge
node
node
in
in
edge
in
in
in
in
in
reach
reach in
reach
node reach node
Fig. 9. Graphical encoding of the Hamiltonian cycles problem.
are constraints respectively forbidding that two edges in the path with the same
origin go to two different targets, and vice versa, that two different origin nodes
go to a common target. Formulas (7),(8) define the transitive closure reach of
predicate in. Finally, (8) is a constraint forbidding that a node y cannot be
reached from another node x.
Figure 10 shows three diagrams respectively depicting a possible example of
input graph (facts for predicate edge) plus the two corresponding stable models
that represent the Hamiltonian paths of the input graph.
edge0 1
2 3
edge
ed
ge
edge
edge
edg
e edge
in0 1
2 3
in
in
in
in0 1
2 3
in
in in
Fig. 10. A graph and its two stable models corresponding to the Hamiltonian paths.
Given an Equilibrium Beta Graph G we define its corresponding Peirce’s
Beta Graph G∗ as the result of replacing all rectangles in G by ellipses4.
4 We could alternatively say that G∗ is just “Peirce’s reading” of G without need
of any transformation, since a rectangle is also a case of closed curve, and Peirce’s
original approach would make no real distinction between ellipses and rectangles.
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Proposition 1. Let Φ(G) denote the first-order formula associated to G under
the interpretation in the current paper and Φ(G∗) the formula associated to G∗
under Peirce’s beta graphs interpretation. Then Φ(G) and Φ(G∗) are equivalent
in classical First-Order Logic. uunionsq
6 Conclusions
By introducing a minimal variation on Peirce’s existential graphs (the introduc-
tion of rectangles), we have presented a diagrammatic representation of Quan-
tified Equilibrium Logic and ASP programs. In fact, the current formulation
allows representing any intermediate logic, since it has just allowed defining
implication, disjunction and universal quantification as primitive constructions,
rather than derived operators in terms of conjunction, negation and existential
quantifiers.
This note constitutes a preliminary proposal but, obviously, much work is
left to do yet. First, it is unclear yet how to provide a fully visual semantic
characterisation, especially for beta diagrams. Another desirable feature would
be a set of inference and equivalence diagram-rewriting rules that covered QHT
in a sound and complete way.
Under the ASP perspective, it is interesting to note that not every QEL
formula has a direct correspondence to an ASP program: for instance, formulas
beginning by existential quantifiers are not ASP representable. It would also be
interesting to identify graphical features about the kind of diagrams that have a
direct translation into ASP. This also includes the graphical characterisation of
safety conditions, required for a suitable grounding. The introduction of complex
ASP constructs such as aggregates or preferences, or even the diagrammatic
representation for arithmetic expressions constitutes and important difficulty to
be solved yet. Finally, regarding implementation, a promising line to explore
would be the integration of this graphical notation into a visual tool for ASP
like the one in [14].
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